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The Problem with
ABA Standard 405(c)
Kathryn Stanchi
I ﬁnd myself in a diﬃcult position, having been tasked with commenting on
a “best practices” model for ABA Standard 405(c).1 I believe Professor Melissa
Weresh’s guidelines,2 as well-thought-out and well-meaning as they are, give
Standard 405(c) a dignity and legitimacy it doesn’t deserve. Standard 405(c)
is a pale substitute for tenure and a damaging double standard. And, as a
practical matter, the power to administer Standard 405(c)—and implement
these “best practices”—will likely be in the hands of those who fought what
little security it gives. The sad truth is that Standard 405(c), at least as it is
currently implemented, can’t be ﬁxed.
Of course, I understand the practical reasons that clinicians and legal
writing faculty would accept or even ﬁght for Standard 405(c), and I certainly
don’t blame us for grabbing it. After years of job insecurity, intellectual
disparagement, and pay inequity, Standard 405(c) looks not too bad.
But this essay takes the position that clinicians and legal writing faculty
deserve better than “not too bad.” Standard 405(c) needs to be called out for
what it is: an institutionalized bar to professional advancement divorced from
any reasonable measure of merit.
If all law faculty members, regardless of subject matter taught, were hired
on the same track, whether tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be diﬀerent.
Or if all faculty members, regardless of subject taught, were given the option
of tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be diﬀerent. Or if all law faculty
members were hired on Standard 405(c) with tenure awarded to the most
accomplished and productive, the standard would at least have some claim to
surface fairness. But this isn’t how Standard 405(c) currently works. Instead,
Standard 405(c) singles out certain faculty for lesser status based purely on
what subject they teach. It enshrines the discriminatory notion that, regardless
Kathryn Stanchi is the Jack E. Feinberg ‘57 Professor of Litigation at Temple University’s Beasley
School of Law. She expresses many thanks to Sarah Katz, Ellie Margolis, and Kristen Murray for
insightful edits on prior drafts. Sara Mohamed provided excellent research help.
1.

SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2016–2017, at 29 (2016).

2.

Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 538 (2017).

Journal of Legal Education, Volume 66, Number 3 (Spring 2017)

The Problem with ABA Standard 405(c)

559

of merit or accomplishment, “your kind” can go only so far. This kind of
categorical double standard is not defensible.
Suppressing Growth and Potential
Like many categorically biased rules, Standard 405(c) is irrational.
It artiﬁcially suppresses the growth and potential of certain faculty by
discouraging them from behavior that might enhance their teaching and the
reputations of their institutions. Standard 405(c) categorically excludes clinical
and legal writing faculty from tenure, regardless of meritorious performance.
Regardless of how much they publish, how well they teach, or how laudatory
their service to the institution, they do not get tenure. Standard 405(c) brands
clinicians and legal writing faculty as “other” and “lesser”—and as with most
branding and categorization it is persistent. Standard 405(c)’s branding,
therefore, discourages upward movement and embeds the existing hierarchy.
Although psychologists may disagree about the value of status hierarchies
within an institution, there is no support for hierarchies that “do not reward
based on performance.”3
Under Standard 405(c), clinicians and legal writing faculty do not even get
to compete for tenure. This institutionalized bar on advancement is based not
on merit but on a broad categorization. Although, as noted below, this ceiling
on advancement can inhibit excellence in all aspects of the academic job, it
likely has the greatest inhibitory eﬀect on scholarly production. Scholarship
is time-consuming and diﬃcult, particularly for clinicians and legal writing
faculty, whose teaching duties are labor- and time-intensive. Standard 405(c)
does not oﬀer the kind of institutional reward required for the production of
scholarship, especially with the teaching loads of most clinicians and legal
writing faculty. Moreover, Standard 405(c) gives law schools an explicit reason
not to support clinical and legal writing scholarship. In addition, Standard
405(c) doesn’t oﬀer nearly the same employment protection as tenure for
faculty who wish to say something provocative or controversial.
This is particularly illogical as scholarship is considered to be the faculty
responsibility most connected to the prestige and reputation of the institution.
Why wouldn’t we want a system where all players had the incentive to produce
the most rigorous, original or analytically cogent work? But under Standard
405(c), that is not what we have.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty cannot even compete fairly with our
peers. As with most discriminatory practices, Standard 405(c) raises the
question of why, given our obvious inferiority, everyone is afraid to let us
compete. Why the need to legislate our second-class status if it is a given? The
answer is that at some point it was decided, without a shred of support, that
legal writing and clinics were not as rigorous, intellectually challenging, or
valuable as other subjects. And so a vicious hierarchical cycle began.
3.

Jeﬀrey Pfeﬀer & Nancy Langton, The Eﬀect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, and
Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 382, 388
(1993) (discussing wage dispersion among faculty in the academy) (emphasis in original).
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The Category Problem
Standard 405(c) is reserved for clinical teachers and some legal writing
faculty. Thus, at the outset, a determination is being made that certain subjects
are less worthy of tenure, categorically. Faculty who teach “substantive”
subjects4 are presumed to deserve tenure; clinicians and legal writing faculty
are presumed not to deserve it.
In reality, of course, as with all categorical thinking, Standard 405(c) is both
under- and over-inclusive. Many clinicians and legal writing faculty—including
those who continue to be excluded from tenure—have proved themselves,
against all odds, to have met or exceeded the standards for tenure.5 And many
faculty members who teach “substantive” courses—despite every advantage—
have proved themselves to be substandard or unproductive scholars, poor
teachers, or both. I think some, perhaps many, clinicians and legal writing
faculty have something to say that is worth listening to. And some tenure-track
or tenured faculty may not. Isn’t the better system the one that divides people
based on what they have to say, not one that assumes that one group does have
something to say and the other group, categorically, does not?
Of course, all categorical thinking, based as it is on heuristic thinking, is
susceptible to this criticism. That doesn’t necessarily make it a bad thing. The
mental shortcut that categories provide is necessary to keep the world from
being overwhelmingly complicated. But here, the categorical thinking fosters
harmful stereotypes by treating a class of people diﬀerently for arbitrary
reasons.
The categorical thinking underlying Standard 405(c) makes no institutional
sense. Because Standard 405(c) suppresses advancement for certain groups,
the academy is depriving itself of potential excellence.6 Empirically, there is
4.
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no question that arbitrary hierarchies (those unrelated to performance) inhibit
productivity.7 The opportunity to fairly compete might not only inspire
clinicians and legal writing faculty to excel, but might spur other faculty to be
better as well.8
The argument that clinical and legal writing faculty are hired based on
“diﬀerent” criteria only supports my point that Standard 405(c) enshrines
and supports an arbitrary and categorical distinction. First, it presumes that
diﬀerent hiring criteria are appropriate, which I’m not sure is true. I think
law schools, especially in these diﬃcult times, should be seriously rethinking
their standard hiring criteria to get a little more diversity of all kinds in our
institutions (experiential diversity; educational diversity; and racial, class, and
gender diversity). But more important, the “diﬀerent criteria” argument is
really a “lesser merit criteria” argument. It is another (perhaps politer) way of
saying certain subjects are not as worthy and the people who teach them are
not as excellent. This is logically fallacious. Beyond that, it is simply wrong to
treat other human beings in such a disparaging and dismissive way.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty have much of value to impart to our
institutions—in their scholarship, in teaching, in their connections to the
practicing bar. And I believe that, especially in these times, when law schools
are increasingly called upon to connect with the practicing bar, we need to
expand our view of what good scholarship is. But Standard 405(c) allows us
to remain stagnant, doing things just as we have always done.
But while the institutional cost of Standard 405(c) is worth noting, it
isn’t what makes Standard 405(c) such an embarrassment. Making broad
categorical judgments about human beings—and their value—should be
something we do only in rare instances because of the risk of bias and damage.
We should interrogate ourselves carefully when we are tempted to do this to
make sure that it is a moral choice free from discriminatory eﬀect. While it
may be easier to generalize about people, lazy thinking is simply never a good
enough reason to discriminate.
Similarly, institutional autonomy, a rationale frequently raised against
ABA rules about treatment of faculty status, is not a persuasive argument in
favor of Standard 405(c).9 We should be honest with ourselves about what
this autonomy really entails: the freedom to institutionalize a discriminatory
hierarchy. Opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act made similar arguments
about that bill’s potentially devastating eﬀect on the freedom of private
7.

See, e.g., Pfeﬀer & Langton, supra note 3, at 396 (wage dispersion negatively aﬀects faculty
productivity).
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See, e.g., id. at 387 (tying job wages to productivity serves as an incentive for all employees to
work harder).
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See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN.
L. REV. 183, 197 (2008).
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businesses.10 The argument here is similar, and the answer should be the same.
There is, or should be, no freedom to discriminate.
The Human Costs
The human cost of Standard 405(c) is real and harmful. When they are
arbitrary or discriminatory, status hierarchies exact a serious toll on those
upon whom they are imposed.11 Institutionalizing status also tends to be
a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, making movement from lower to higher ranks
exceptionally diﬃcult.12 As one study put it:
[O]nce a hierarchy gets established, a number of organizational and psychological processes conspire to create diﬀerent degrees of opportunity to . . .
acquire more power and status for individuals and groups at diﬀerent levels
of the hierarchy . . . . [T]hese processes aﬀect all members of the hierarchy in
ways that perpetuate the established order.13

For example, when a faculty member is hired on the tenure track, he is hired
with the strong presumption that he will succeed. It is almost unheard of that
he would be “demoted” to Standard 405(c) status. The diﬀerence this makes
on a human level cannot be overstated; it simply feels diﬀerent (and better) to
be hired with the enthusiasm and energy of that presumption of achievement.
The conﬁrmation bias attending this is also real.14 The presumption of success
means work—both scholarship and teaching—is viewed through that lens, by
other faculty, by students, and by others. It gives a faculty member the real
support of colleagues and the conﬁdence to succeed. That usually translates
into more productivity and investment in the institution. I’m not saying
that tenure-track faculty do not deserve this presumption, but rather that all
faculty deserve it. And that our institutions and students deserve the kind of
camaraderie and work that is encouraged by this presumption.
The opposite occurs for those hired on the “lesser” track of Standard 405(c).
The performance of those in the lower ranks will be viewed through the lens
of their inferior status. What scholarship is produced will likely be viewed
skeptically and critically—conﬁrmation bias is at work here as well. Students
10.

See generally TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PARTIES, TWO PRESIDENTS
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MACLEAN, DEBATING THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 26–27
(2009) (outlining Barry Goldwater’s objections to the Civil Rights bill).
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Indeed, research shows that people tend to overestimate the skills and abilities of those at the
top of the hierarchical structure. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 67.
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also absorb the message. Since students run the law reviews, clinicians and
legal writing faculty likely won’t get a fair hearing from the highest-ranked
law reviews. As a result, the skeptical views created by the hierarchy will be
reinforced. In the classroom, students will tend not to give the beneﬁt of
the doubt and may even be disrespectful or challenging, leading to poor
evaluations and yet more “objective” evidence that inferior status is deserved.
Again, this is so damaging on a human level, but also so damaging to the
institution and its students.
Standard 405(c) also has serious emotional costs. It institutionally
entrenches a group of people as “less than” their colleagues. This constant
reminder that the workplace has decided that certain faculty aren’t as good,
and never will be, damages self-conception. Faculty members on this track
may begin to believe that they are less valuable. They may begin to believe
they have nothing worth writing in scholarship, so they don’t try.15 They may
not speak up at faculty meetings or committee meetings because they question
the worth of their input.16 This is a real problem with entrenched hierarchies.17
And it robs the institution of so much valuable input while also robbing the
employees of their dignity and self-respect.
The discriminatory aspect of this hierarchy is even more troubling when
we consider its intersection with race and gender, topics covered ably in other
essays by my colleagues Mel Weresh, Kristen Tiscione, Ann McGinley, and
Teri McMurtry-Chubb. Indeed, given what we know about the gender and
race composition of law faculties, upon close inspection it gets harder and
harder to justify that “diﬀerent hiring criteria” argument. Professors Weresh,
McGinley and McMurtry-Chubb make clear that Standard 405(c) takes
advantage of and perpetuates the structural sexism and racism of our society.
This should make us very, very uncomfortable.
Standard 405(c) is also damaging to those at the top of the hierarchy.18 Power
“fundamentally transforms how an individual construes and approaches the
15.

Id. at 66 (aggregating studies showing hierarchy suppressed input by low-ranking group
members and overvalued input by higher-ranking group members); id. at 76 (lower rank
reduces self-perception and makes people feel they have less to contribute) (aggregating
studies).
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Studies have “consistently shown” that lower-ranked employees stay silent instead of raising
important issues. Psychologists describe what they call “paranoid social cognition” among
those in the lower ranks of an organizational hierarchy. This is evidenced by anxiety, mistrust,
and suspiciousness, especially of those in the higher ranks. The result is a reluctance to
communicate. Id. at 78.
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comments of their untenured colleagues (citing Dacher Keltner & Robert J. Robinson,
Defending the Status Quo: Power and Bias in Social Conﬂict, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1066, 1075–76 (1997)).
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world.” Speciﬁcally, those in the higher ranks are more likely to view those in
the lower ranks less as individuals and more in terms of group characteristics or
stereotypes.19 This is not to say that tenured faculty are bad people or bigoted,
but that we are all human.20 And hierarchy, especially if based on categorical
structures, is “sneaky.” It aﬀects our worldview in many ways without our even
realizing it.21 It changes our mind-sets in ways that I think all of us can agree
is not anything to aspire to.
Standard 405(c) also makes intrastatus friendships and collaboration
diﬃcult.22 It creates a system in which tenured faculty, however well-intentioned
or kind, may treat contract faculty diﬀerently. I confess that I have been guilty
of this on occasion myself since I’ve received tenure. It is just so hard not to
when you are at meetings others cannot attend or privy to decision-making
that others are not part of.
The bottom line is that Standard 405(c) fosters exclusionary thinking.
People may say hurtful things and not even notice that the statements are
inappropriate.23 For example, I have seen well-meaning tenured faculty simply
forget that clinicians or legal writing faculty are faculty and thus not include
them when speaking about what faculty do or teach. Or leave them out of
email discussions. I don’t think this is malicious. It is just the natural human
result of the divisiveness created by a status hierarchy like Standard 405(c).
Conclusion
For all these reasons, I think Standard 405(c) as it is currently implemented
is a very ﬂawed rule, damaging to law schools, students, and all faculty,
tenured and nontenured. We simply shouldn’t have a faculty hierarchy based
on generalizations and stereotypes. We especially shouldn’t have such a thing
if there is any chance that such a hierarchy reinforces or takes advantage of
structural racism or patriarchy.
I recognize that status evolution is a gradual process starting with small
steps. And I laud Professor Weresh for a thoughtful and commendable step
19.

Magee & Galinsky, supra note 12, at 370–71.
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Indeed, many tenured law professors are not only wonderful people, but committed to
social justice and eradicating discrimination. In some ways, this can exacerbate the problems
created by Standard 405(c)—if we are committed to social justice and are confronted with
a discriminatory status hierarchy, we might be more likely to look for justiﬁcations to
legitimatize that hierarchy so we can live with ourselves. See, e.g., Eddie Harmon-Jones, A
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, 102–03 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002);
KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND CONTEXT 68–69 (1981).
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and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995).
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forward. But even with a “best practices” document, I cannot defend ABA
Standard 405(c) the way it is implemented now. I think we can, and should,
do better.

